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In 1997, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two constitutional cases, each dealing with the scope of congressional power.
In each case, the Court held a federal statute unconstitutional. City of
1
Boerne v. Flores, the better known of the two, found unconstitutional
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, passed by overwhelming
numbers in both Houses of Congress in 1993 in response to the
2
Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which had
abandoned prior constitutional requirements to accommodate certain religiously motivated conduct. The Court in City of Boerne v.
Flores concluded that Congress had overstepped its bounds, failing to
appreciate that its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment were only to enforce Section 1’s prohibitions—as the
Court understood them. In language widely viewed as an effort to foreclose congressional dialogue with the Court about constitutional interpretation, the Court wrote:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best
when each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and
the proper actions and determinations of the other branches. When the
Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.
When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles,
3
including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
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Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author thanks Frank Michelman, Geoffrey Stone, Mark Tushnet, Jeff Clements,
Marge Baker and Bob Taylor for their helpful discussions or comments and, of course,
Barry Friedman, for his remarkable book that provides occasion for these reflections. My
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521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding application of
a general ban on peyote to sacramental use of the substance).
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535–36 (citations omitted).
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In several subsequent cases, the Court found federal statutes or portions thereof to be unconstitutional, as exceeding Congress’s Four4
teenth Amendment powers as limited by Boerne.
The other 1997 case, somewhat less far-reaching, was Printz v.
5
United States. It, too, involved a statute enacted only a few years earlier, as a part of the 1993 Brady Handgun Act. The Court in Printz
held that a provision requiring local law enforcement officers to perform background checks on would-be gun purchasers for five years
was an unconstitutional “commandeering” of state officials. The dissenting opinions argued that the Constitution’s text was silent on the
issue; the Federalist Papers seemed to assert that state executives
would be called on to implement federal law; and other sources were
6
weak or at best ambiguous on whether Congress had such power. It
was, Justice Breyer’s dissent argued, therefore reasonable to consider
the experience of other federalisms in order to determine what the
consequences of this statute were likely to be for a healthy U.S. federalism; and in light of experience in robust European federalisms
with centralized requirements implemented by subnational officials,
7
the federal statute should be upheld. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, rebuffed this effort to learn from comparative constitutional
experience: “We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to
the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
8
relevant to the task of writing one.”
In each of these cases, the majority sought to wall off interpretive
sources from “outside” a very limited set of materials focused primarily on the Court’s own precedents. A real accomplishment of Barry
9
Friedman’s superb book, The Will of the People, is to show how unavailing efforts are to entirely wall constitutional law off from the domain
of public experience and opinion. Friedman’s narrative has a richness of detail, a sense of mastery of large-scale historical trends, and
an ease and elegance of writing that will surely make this required
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See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
E.g., id., at 945-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (criticizing Printz’s reasoning and its categorical anticommandeering rule, and arguing for a more flexible approach to judicial enforcement
of federalism-based limits on congressional power).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 921 n.11.
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
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reading for all serious students of constitutional history. For Friedman, it is the ongoing interaction between the Court and the public—in its various manifestations through legislative and executive activity, as well as more general public opinion—that constitutes the
genius of the American system of judicial review. After reading
Friedman’s book, one can have no question that shifting understandings of the relationship between law and society presently, and will
continue to, influence the Court’s understanding of the Constitution.
Indeed, in a constitutional democracy with a difficult to amend constitution, it is hard to imagine that the Court or the Constitution
could otherwise survive.
Friedman’s fine book raises many questions, both positive and
normative. As a positive matter, it is not clear whether the book demonstrates the influence of public opinion, or of major power holders, or what the relationship between these two are. Moreover, it is
not clear what public opinion is, or whose views count. Is it the views
of Gallup and other polls? Is it the views of editorial writers? Or is it
the views of elected legislatures? Is it something expressed over generations or something expressed in shorter time cycles? Further,
what are the mechanisms by which shifts in public or legislative opinion affect the Court, and how do they relate to each other and the
larger process Friedman describes? Part I addresses these questions.
The book also raises important normative issues. Friedman insists
on the following questions’ importance: Is adjudication in the U.S.
Supreme Court sufficiently independent from public opinion? Is it sufficiently “countermajoritarian”? Friedman does not propose that public opinion should in some way “count” as an independent factor in
constitutional adjudication, from an internal perspective of how the
Court conceptualizes its work. But if part of the normative grounding of the Court’s legitimacy lies in its relationship to public opinion, what principles should guide the justices in deciding whether
public opinion is or is not relevant on a particular point of constitutional law? Or is the question purely a prudential one? And if the
Court’s legitimacy is grounded in its relationship to U.S. public opinion, does this have implications for the relevance of foreign experience? Do we need a new constitutional theory to accommodate the
answer to these questions? I discuss these normative issues of interpretation in Part II.
Finally, the work implicitly raises questions about the role of formal amendment under Article V of the Constitution and its relationship to legitimate interpretation. If, as Friedman provocatively argues, the “people” in 1937 decided that the Court had power to
amend the Constitution, then what, if anything, is left for Article V?
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Should we adopt a presumption against amendment, so as to avoid
10
what Kathleen Sullivan describes as “constitutional amendmentitis”?
Or does Friedman’s work implicitly suggest a parallel risk of “constitutional amendophobia”? I discuss this briefly in Part III, in the context of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Feder11
al Election Commission.
I. WHAT IS THE STORY?
This part proceeds by way of a series of questions about the positive account Friedman offers.
Whose will? A striking element of the rich history Friedman provides is its description of the array of influences to which the Court
has responded—not always “the people,” but sometimes to more particular power holders. So, in describing the late nineteenth century,
he writes: “By abandoning blacks and embracing corporations the
12
Court rose to the pinnacle of power.” Perhaps what his historical
work shows is the Court’s responsiveness over time to power holders, a
point that may be of some salience in this period of time after Citizens
United.
This positive point may have normative implications. If it is the
dialogue with the people that helps legitimate the Court’s power of
judicial review in a democracy, the quality and nature of the Court’s
dialogue depends on the quality of the democracy in which it operates. If it is the people who hold and exercise power, then dialogue
with that power holder will enhance the democratic accountability of
the Court and address the countermajoritarian difficulty. If, however, power vis-à-vis the Court is held or exercised by bodies other than
the people, or is distorted by corrupt or abusive influences in the
body politic, Friedman’s response to the countermajoritarian difficul13
ty is perhaps correspondingly weaker, unless we believe that public
opinion can be clearly manifested without regard to these distortions.
10

11
12

13

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 1995, available at
http://www.prospect.org//cs/articles?article=constitutional_amendmentitis;
see
also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment
Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1996) [hereinafter Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy].
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications cannot be prohibited under the First Amendment).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 138; see also id. at 186 (referring to “electoral dysfunctions” as
impairing judicial reform in the early twentieth century). Where there are “electoral dysfunctions,” in what form is the “will of the people” heard?
On the other hand, if the product of the democratic process in the form of legislation is
not itself entitled to respect as representing the will of the majority because of distortions
or corruption, the countermajoritarian difficulty may be correspondingly diminished.
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More generally, one might ask whether under Friedman’s view the
public can develop “a will,” apart from that crystallized in the decisions of the public’s representative bodies. Sometimes, perhaps, it
does. But how often is our perception of public will an artifact, for
example, of polling? Or of the particular moment one election is
held? Do we care about the “will” as expressed in passive response to
pollsters’ questions, or the “deliberative” will of the people’s representatives acting in legislative bodies? Given differential intensity of
preferences and differential willingness or capacity of advocates and
opponents to mobilize grassroots sentiment, legislation may be
enacted that a majority is not especially happy with. What should be
regarded as the will of the people?
Indeed, the people may not have “a” will but multiple “wills,”
whose existence complicates what Friedman memorably calls the
“bungee cord” or outer range of public tolerance of the Court’s deci14
sions. For example, Friedman describes congressional reaction to a
series of decisions in 1956 and 1957 that were criticized as unduly
15
protecting the rights of Communists. The public criticism and legislative moves towards limiting the Court’s jurisdiction or overruling a
preemption decision to allow state prosecutions of suspected subversives, he suggests, may have contributed to the Court’s retrenchment
the following term. But what was the will of the people—was it
represented by the criticism? By the proposed legislation? Or by the
16
failure to enact the proposed legislation? Friedman comments, in a
footnote, that “[w]here the broader public stood precisely in all this
17
is anyone’s guess.” If not by the proposed legislation, Friedman
suggests, perhaps the Court (or specifically, Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan) was affected by serious academic criticism of the Court’s “ac18
tivism” or claimed lack of principle in Brown v. Board of Education.
Yet there have been other periods with harsh attacks on the Court
14

15
16

17
18

FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 373. For a critique of Friedman for confusing the views of editorial writers with popular views in connection with the 1940s Jehovah’s Witnesses cases,
see Justin Driver, Why Law Should Lead, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 2010, at 28, 30.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 252-54.
On the more general problem of reading the “sounds of [legislative] silence,” compare,
e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 262 (arguing that “even in the context of a statute’s amendment, Congress’s
failure to ‘correct’ a settled interpretation cannot be equated with an affirmative intention to ratify that interpretation”) with Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 512–13 (suggesting that congressional inaction or silence can be a relevant interpretive tool).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 514 n.175.
347 U.S. 483 (1954). For Friedman’s description of Learned Hand’s and Herbert Wechsler’s attacks on the Court, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 256–57.
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from, for example, the American Bar Association, which did not ap19
pear to have any such effects. The connection between public critique of Brown and the Justices’ shifts on the subversive cases is at best
complex, for while the shift may have been away from “activism,” it
arguably opened up the Justices to further criticism for departing
20
from principle.
If the failed legislation in response to the 1957 domestic security
cases represented the will of the people—or the possibility in the future of developing a constraint on public tolerance—what was the
role of public opinion in perhaps the most famous decision of the
post-World War II period, Brown v. Board of Education? Friedman reports that the summer after Brown was decided, public opinion was
running slightly in favor of the decision (though not in the South);
and under Friedman’s theory, it matters less whether the Court led or
followed, so long as the decision was within what the society would
accept. But while Friedman discusses as part of the “path to Brown”
shifting public opinion arising out of revulsion against the German
racist practices, he does not discuss the almost successful legislative
effort, in early 1954, to add the so-called “Bricker Amendment” to the
21
Constitution. The proposed Bricker Amendment was designed to
limit the domestic legal effects of treaties; it came within one vote of
passing the Senate in 1954, just months before Brown came down.
One of the several concerns of some proponents of this amendment
was to prevent reliance on the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, or other human rights instruments to invalidate
22
state segregation laws. If introduced but not enacted legislation af19

20
21

22

See, e.g., William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why
Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 487–92 (2002) (noting attacks on the
Court between 1937 and 1954, including virulent attack in 1939 by the President of the
ABA as well as threats of impeachment, and academic attacks of comparable sharpness in
the same time period).
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 254–55 (noting observers’ concerns that the Justices
were “reversing course in response to public discontent and threats of political reprisal”).
For a brief summary and thoughtful treatment, see Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification Of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J INT’L L. 341, 348–50 (1995).
For longer treatments, see sources cited infra note 22.
See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY:
A TEST OF
EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 70–71 (1988) (“Southern Democrats found the
Bricker amendment particularly appealing because of their fear that the United Nations
Charter, the Genocide Convention, or a covenant on human rights could be used to invalidate segregation laws in the various states or enact federal civil rights legislation.”); see
also DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
1776–1995, at 340–42 (1996) (describing Senator Bricker’s proposed constitutional
amendment as a direct response to the UN’s human rights initiatives); cf. MARY L.
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 44–45
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ter the 1957 subversives cases is arguably relevant evidence of public
opinion, what would Professor Friedman say about the Bricker
Amendment? True, Bricker was not a direct response to a Supreme
Court decision. It might simply have been viewed as being in a different domain from the issues in Brown—as being primarily con23
cerned with the effect of treaties—and thus not salient. Yet its public importance in the period while Brown was pending in the Supreme
Court suggests the need to explore further the questions raised in
this section about Friedman’s method and meaning.
The larger point has to do with methodology and causal claims. It
is somewhat problematic to ascribe to failed legislative efforts a distinctive public will to which the Court can be described as conforming. The elegance of Friedman’s writing may obscure a bit of the
“chronology equals causality” assumption, and its attendant possibilities of error, arguably at work in this seemingly seamless narrative.
Friedman concludes that “[i]t is apparent time and again that
what the Supreme Court responds to most often is the sustained voice
of the people as expressed through the long process of contesting
24
constitutional decisions.” But the “sustained voice” claim is in some
tension with the more short term stories Friedman tells in the late
1950s, or (with respect to the Equal Rights Amendment) in the
1970s. Moreover, the notion that the constitutional law we get is,
generally speaking, what a majority wants, seems doubtful. On many
issues of constitutional law, contemporary majorities may have no
will, as the issue has not risen to public notice except among a relatively small group of those most affected—for example, the details of
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, or Fifth Amendment selfincrimination law, or what counts as double jeopardy. On other issues, what the majority says it wants may, depending on the issue, be a
25
product of how questions are phrased in public opinion polls. And
in some cases a powerful social movement may have a momentum

23
24
25

(2000) (discussing NAACP’s 1947 petition to the U.N. to protest and investigate racial
discrimination in the United States).
My thanks to Mark Tushnet for the point about domains.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 383.
George Gallup noted long ago that on some issues responses to public opinion polls were
very sensitive to the wording used, while on other issues there was more stability of opinion expressed. See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 94–95 (2002). For more recent studies,
see Graham Kalton et al., Experiments in Wording Opinion Questions, 27 APPLIED STAT. 149
(1978). Cf. Robert M. Groves, Research on Survey Data Quality, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. S156
(1987); Jennifer Jerit, Issue Framing and Engagement; Rhetorical Strategy in Public Policy Debates, 30 POL. BEHAV. 1 (2008) (discussing impact of different rhetorical strategies on public opinion).
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26

behind it without clarity on what a “majority” supports.
Maybe
Friedman’s argument could be better understood as a claim that the
Court’s rulings generally stay within what a majority of “the people”
do not strongly and sustainably object to. But this weakens the force
of Friedman’s assertion that the Court’s decisions are “ratified” by the
27
people; they may simply be acquiesced to because they are not
strongly opposed by relevant pluralities.
But does the historical narrative Friedman offers persuade the
reader of the accuracy of Robert Dahl’s observation that the Court’s
decisions will not stay out of line, for too long, from the preferences
of those who hold power in the law-making branches of govern28
ment? Generally, yes. Friedman contributes to a line of scholarship
on the relationship of Supreme Court decisions on issues of public
moment and public opinion, going back at least to James Bryce’s observation in 1891 that public “[o]pinion is stronger in America than
anywhere else in the world, and judges are only men. . . . A court is
sometimes so swayed consciously, more often unconsciously, because
29
the pervasive sympathy of numbers is irresistible.” Does Friedman’s
work cast light on the mechanisms by which this occurs? The answer
here is less clear.
What are the mechanisms for the Court’s sensitivity to public opinion?
Friedman’s work explores the interaction of a number of complex
30
mechanisms, or means, by which the Court’s decisions stay more or
26

27
28

29
30

Friedman notes the importance of social movements in constructing public views. There
is no doubt that social movements are important in this way, but the success of a social
movement in changing discourse, e.g., on the Second Amendment, or on campaign
finance, does not tell us what “will of the people” is; majority views may be up for grabs
for a long time. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1356 (2006) (discussing the “consent condition” for constitutional contestation while acknowledging that
“because the consent condition does not guarantee speakers equality of resources or authority, it can naturalize radically antidemocratic forms of subordination” and that in a
“constitutional order . . . marked by social stratification or [unequal] opportunities for
democratic voice . . . the consent condition . . . will reproduce and legitimate these conditions”). Social movements may expand the range of plausible interpretive choice without
necessarily yielding a clear will of the people. No doubt that the Court is over time responsive, but a stable equilibrium on particular decisions or issues may not occur as often
as the book suggests.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 381.
See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 293 (1957) (observing that “the Supreme Court is inevitably a part
of the dominant national alliance”).
JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 267 (2d ed. 1891).
I am not using the word “mechanism” here in the technical sense of academic economics.
Cf. Roger B. Myerson, Mechanism Design, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS ONLINE (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008), available
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less in line with what “the people” are willing to accept. Among the
mechanisms his work touches on are the following: 1) appointments
and the effects of changing membership; 2) sitting justices changing
their views, whether consciously or unconsciously, under the persuasive influence of shifts in public or elite opinion; and 3) sitting justices changing their views, again, whether consciously or unconsciously,
under the influence of (a) more seemingly coercive forms of influence, including threats or action by the political branches manifestly
designed to restrict, influence or constrain the Court’s decisions, or
perhaps (b) the possibility of resistance or noncompliance that is anticipated.
As Friedman observes, his claim is that constitutional interpretation works to stay in rough balance with public opinion not so much
because the Court is wise or discerning, but because the process of
constitutional adjudication occurs over time, and through a regular
process of decision, response, and, in cases of continuing controversy,
repeated opportunities to re-decide similar issues as public views play
31
out over time. The possibility of repeat litigation over similar issues,
present in part because of the decentralized and common law structures in which the Supreme Court operates, in part because of the
large and federal character of the nation, which sustains many different governments, is an important aspect of the mechanisms Friedman has identified to account for the Court’s sensitivities to public
opinion. Yet the insight raises many questions, including the degree
to which changes in membership—taking place over the time period
of iterative litigation—are responsible for the Court’s shifts, or how
often instead changes in judicial doctrine result from the conscious
or unconscious reactions of judges to public opinion, political branch
action, or feared resistance.
A considerable literature has arisen to debate whether the Court
votes “sincerely” in accord with the Justices’ own views, or “strategically” in light of (inter alia) the tolerances and expected reactions of the
32
political branches. Each of these modalities might be thought to

31
32

at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000132 (describing a
“mechanism” as a “specification of how economic decisions are determined as a function
of the information that is known by the individuals in the economy,” and a “mathematical
methodology for analyzing [sic] economic efficiency subject to incentive constraints,” entailing both “incentive constraints” and “resource constraints”).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 382–84.
See generally Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a Strategic
National Policymaker, 50 Emory L.J. 583 (2001) (describing the debate between “attitudinalist” and “strategic voting” models, and arguing for a more strategic understanding of
the voting behavior of Supreme Court justices).
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correspond to different mechanisms for sustaining a relationship between public views and court decisions: the appointment process, by
which new Justices with sincere convictions different from the prevailing jurisprudence may join the Court, and the interaction between
political signals by external actors and the internal deliberative
process by which Justices take account of the range of factors, including prudential concerns about expected reactions.
Friedman’s work offers tantalizing glimpses of each of these modalities. For example, Friedman suggests, shifts in Justices Frankfurter’s and Harlan’s votes after the 1957 Communist Party cases appear
likely to be (at least in part) a reaction to expressions of unhappiness
33
with the Court from Congress, the ABA, or legal scholars; and, he
also suggests, Stewart’s and White’s switch to support for state death
34
penalty statutes after Furman v. Georgia is likely attributable to public
35
views. But to establish that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan voted insincerely might require more. Judges, no less than other people,
have a high capacity to convince themselves of the rightness or correctness of what is strategically advantageous; distinguishing con36
scious choice from unconscious influence is thus a challenge. On
the death penalty cases, the accepted legal doctrine makes the permissibility of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment dependent
on “evolving standards of decency,” including what is generally re-

33
34
35

36

FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 250–62.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 285–88. Since much of the uproar over the subversives cases
built on Southern unhappiness with the Court over Brown, it is worth noting that three
weeks after the Jenner-Butler jurisdiction stripping bill failed to pass, the Court issued its
unanimous decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)—certainly not the move of a
chastened body. See Ross, supra note 19, at 508 (“Although the defeat of the JennerButler Bill three weeks before the Court decided Cooper may have emboldened the Court,
many liberals preferred to argue that the narrowness with which the measure was defeated made Cooper ‘s uncompromising language all the more remarkable.”). But cf.
DUDZIAK, supra note 22, at 115–51 (situating Cooper in Cold War foreign affairs, as a defense of Brown and thus a blow against Communism); Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold
War Case, 91 J. AM. HIST. 32, 35 (2004) (describing how the press called Brown a “‘[b]low
to [c]ommunism’”).
One might want to know more, from the Court’s internal records, about whether in the
later cases these Justices acted inconsistently with their own earlier views. For example,
Professor Friedman lists, as among the post-1957 cases in which Justice Frankfurter voted
with the government, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). See FRIEDMAN, supra note
9, at 515 n.178. Yet according to The Supreme Court in Conference (1940–1985), at 300–07
(Del Dickson, ed., 2001), excerpting from internal conference notes in Scales, initially
heard in 1956, and then reargued more than once, Frankfurter indicated that the law
under which Scales was initially prosecuted was “unwise” but not “unconstitutional”—on
November 2, 1956, well before the 1957 release of decisions that led to the public reaction Friedman describes. Id. at 302.
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37

garded as “cruel and unusual” —state enactment of new death penalty laws after Furman may have gone to this criteria. Although
Friedman suggests that Justices White and Stewart could not have believed that the arbitrariness that troubled them in their opinions in
38
Furman would be cured by the new statutes, the new statutes’ attempts to regulate discretion, combined with changing societal indicators of what is regarded as “cruel and unusual,” may have—within
the domain of legal doctrine—played a role in their decisions.
In the alternative modality, to the extent change in the direction
of public opinion is also reflected in a change in personnel, such an
account may jive entirely with a “sincere” voting account (albeit a diminished role for stare decisis). The appointment process plainly
played a significant role in many of the episodes Friedman talks
39
about—including both Lawrence v. Texas (which overruled Bowers v.
40
41
Hardwick) and the lead up to Boerne v. Flores. Even in the move
42
from Furman to Gregg v. Georgia, the replacement of Justice Douglas
with Justice John Paul Stevens (who voted with Stewart to uphold the
Georgia statute in Gregg) may have resulted in a shift in the persuasive
dynamic on the Court.
Friedman’s book thus raises the question of the relative import of
different mechanisms of the Court’s maintaining itself within what
the public supports (or tolerates): internal deliberations or the external influences created by the episodic appointment process. In
Lawrence, for example, the opinion for the Court was written by Anthony Kennedy (who replaced Lewis Powell, who had voted the other
37

38
39
40
41

42

In Graham v. Florida, the Court stated:
To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look
beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. . . . This is because the standard of extreme cruelty
is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores
of society change.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see infra note 63.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 286–88.
539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 898–99 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part); id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of departing from settled doctrine). The Court that decided this case in 1990 included several
members who were not on the Court when it had decided Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), whose doctrine was generally displaced by Employment Division v. Smith. See supra
p. 413.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (upholding a revised death penalty
scheme allowing juries to impose the death penalty within certain prescribed guidelines).
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way in Bowers); the majority also included Ruth Bader Ginsburg (who
replaced Byron White, who had written the opinion for the Court in
Bowers). But how much of a role the appointment process plays as
compared to shifts in view by an individual justice in response to pub43
lic opinion remains difficult to evaluate. Whatever may have motivated Owen Roberts in the so-called “switch in time that saved nine,”
the New Deal understanding of federal power under the Commerce
Clause could not have been consolidated and extended as it was in
the absence of the several retirements and replacements that oc44
curred between 1937 and the decision in Wickard v. Filburn.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC OPINION AND INTERPRETATION
Friedman puts a great question in his book, concerning the “capacity the justices have to act independently of the public’s views”: In
other words, he asks, do the justices have sufficient capacity for truly
45
independent judgment? As he suggests, this is at least as important
a question as whether the Court is “too” countermajoritarian. These
questions go to the core of the dilemma of the role of a constitutional
court in a democracy. In some cases constitution framers, in moments of insight, altruism or long term understanding of self interest,
might want to have courts that can make decisions independently of
majoritarian sentiment, even if it is to some extent enduring; think of
the multi-year national episodes of xenophobia, such as the period of
the Palmer Raids after World War I, or of the internment of Japanese46
American citizens, upheld in Korematsu v. United States, during World
War II. In other cases, constitutional designers might want courts to
be open to popular influence in understanding changing economies,
changing technologies, or problems relevant to the scope of govern-

43

44
45
46

When the Court apparently changes direction without explicit overruling, there will often
be disagreement on whether or not the factors claimed to account for the shift are “legally relevant.” Even when prior cases are overruled, there will be disagreement over whether the prior decisions should be regarded as correct statements of the law. In order to be
able to account for a change, one must consider the possibility that “legal” as well as “attitudinal” or “strategic” factors play a role, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 748 (2000)
(explaining that judges look to current understandings of the law under the “legal” model, whereas under the “attitudinal” model they simply follow their own ideological preferences), and it may be difficult to get sufficient agreement on what are the legally relevant factors to reliably (in a statistical sense) test other hypotheses.
317 U.S. 111 (1942); see JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE
SUPREME COURT 519–29 (2010).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 373.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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ment power to address contemporary problems. Of course, a difficulty is that the people might well disagree about what kinds of cases fall
into which categories; debt relief legislation might be viewed by creditors as an attack on vested and important individual rights, and by
47
debtors as a necessary governmental response to urgent conditions.
The idea that one would want courts to be independent of majoritarian sentiment might simply reflect an aspiration to impartiality in
48
the decision of particular cases; whatever the legal rule is, the court
should apply it without regard to the popularity or likeability of the
plaintiff or defendant. But in a constitutional democracy, the court’s
independence is intended also to serve the important function of
providing an impartial tribunal to stand between peoples and governments, to act as a check on the abuse of government power—
which requires a special form of impartiality, given that judges are
generally paid by their governments. In this sense, one might see the
aspiration for independence of the courts as reflecting a commitment
to the importance of constitutional principle.
Friedman makes the intriguing suggestion that the Court is independent because the public wants it to be, because the public
49
“grants” that independence to the Court. “[D]iffuse support is the
measure of the slack the Court has to go its own way on some issues. . . . Perhaps nobody really wants a Supreme Court that simply
panders to majority opinion. Maybe people figure that [they could
50
be a minority some day].” On this formulation, the Court’s independence depends on the presence of a competitive system in which
current power holders may become losers; if a very stable majority believes it will always be a majority it will want a subordinate Court.
But while Friedman may be right about the preconditions for public support for judicial independence, this does not necessarily exhaust the reasons to value judicial independence—reasons that go
beyond the positive account grounded in a competitive political environment. Friedman argues that judicial review is normatively valua-

47

48

49
50

Compare Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding state
debtor relief legislation claimed to impair mortgage contracts in violation of the Constitution in light of the nature of current emergency), with id. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution’s meaning does not change and that the legislation impairs the validity of contracts).
Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, Declarations of Independence: Judicial Reactions to Political Pressure,
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 227,
230–31 (Stephen Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (developing the distinction between impartiality as to cases and impartiality as to correct rule).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 379.
Id.
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ble because: (a) it acts as a prod to public deliberation over important questions, through a dialogic process, notably including judicial
“stickiness”; and (b) thereby, over the long run, assists in developing
the Constitution’s meaning in accord with the enduring or long-term
51
will of the people. To the extent that this is a claim about the necessity of connecting judicial discourse about the Constitution with the
developing views of the democratic people, it would find considera52
ble support not only in the U.S. literature but also in Europe. In a
recent book, for example, a European constitutionalist, Victor Ferreres Comella, agrees with Friedman on the importance of dialogue.
Ferreres Comella argues for both the accessibility of constitutional
court decisions to the people and of their gaining the attention of the
people. He insists that constitutional values are, in important part,
the moral consensus of a community, so courts are interpreting and
implementing principles which are themselves rooted in the decisions of the people. And he is in agreement on the importance of
democratic responses—amendment, appointment, interpretive ad53
justment—to the legitimacy of judicial review.
But for Ferreres Comella, these are not necessarily the primary or
only justifications for judicial review; a second set of justifications,
important in both the U.S. and Europe, are quite different. Like
54
Dworkin, Eisgruber, Fiss, and Sager, Ferreres Comella sees courts as
forums of principle or impartiality, and sees judges as more likely to
get right answers to questions of constitutional principle than legislatures. Ferreres Comella makes this argument, suggesting that courts
have the time, the mandate, and institutional interest to focus on
constitutional values, and a greater capacity for ethical and principled
55
decision making than do legislatures or executives. Such arguments
about courts are, in my view, ultimately premised on the belief that
51
52
53
54

55

Id. at 382-84.
See, e.g., VICTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES:
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (2009).
See id. at 96–107.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, at viii (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 2 (1985); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3
(2001); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 199–201 (2004); see also Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 187, 203 (2007) (explaining the Court’s “special competence to arrive at a correct interpretation” of the Constitution, derived from limitations
on judicial power “that commit the judiciary to what might be called public reason,” including an obligation to hear both sides of disputes it will resolve); Lawrence G. Sager,
Courting Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1370–71 (2005) (emphasizing courts’ greater
capacity for impartiality and their “epistemic discipline of coherence”).
See FERRERES COMELLA, supra note 52, at 32–34.
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there are right answers, or better answers, or (at least) less wrong answers, to questions arising under constitutional principles. These
right answers (or less wrong answers) exist, to at least some extent,
apart from the vagaries of public opinion. Courts are there, in part,
to help provide right answers to questions of constitutional values,
56
which overlap with questions of political morality.
This idea of the possibility of right answers as a matter of constitutional principle could be reframed as one about the need to avoid
clearly wrong answers on matters of constitutional principle. Despite
faith in democratic processes, it is hard to sustain the view that democratic processes do not at times reach quite stable but wrong answers
57
in terms of constitutional principle and morality. And it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that one of the normative functions of independent courts is to try to resist the dramatically wrong answers at which
democratic polities sometimes arrive.
The possibility of identifiably wrong constitutional answers leads
me to my final comments, designed to supplement Friedman’s argument towards a theory of legitimate constitutional interpretation.
Friedman’s argument in this book depends on the stickiness and
58
slowness of the Court’s procedures and process of change, together
with the dialogue that they can create, that, for him, constitute the
uniquely self-legitimating features of judicial review in the American
democracy. It is, ultimately, a democratic grounding—albeit a form
of more deliberative democracy.

56

57

58

For arguments for why courts can do this better than legislatures, see id., noting the judiciary’s political insulation, unique function, and reasoned decision-making processes. But
see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 230–32 (2006); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 2
(1999); Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1508 (2007) (“[L]egislators plausibly have better information than
judges about the factual components and causal consequences of their constitutional decisions.”); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1379–80 (2006) (emphasizing moral capacities of legislators); cf. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, at x (1999) (emphasizing the harms of judicial review).
Friedman at one point says that “everything important happens” after decisions—maybe
so with respect to “alignment with popular opinion,” FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 382–83,
but surely not “everything important.” Surely some important things happen at the time
of the judgment. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (affirming
the government’s exclusion of citizens of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast and the
criminal conviction of the petitioner for defying the exclusion orders).
Cf. Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
407, 414 (discussing benefits of the “slower law” that emerges from courts and opposing
change in tenure of Supreme Court justices).
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A constitution typically must find justification in both democratic
consent or accountability and in good or just principles. To attract
adherence as a special form of law, constitutions often are associated
with assertions of general, admirable, and (even) universalizable
principles. True, one could conceive of a constitution as solely an
operating system for governance, defining the election units and periods and allocating powers to government entities; and there are effective constitutions in the world that lean heavily towards the operating rules version with relatively small efforts to constrain democratic
decision making through articulated “rights,” as in Australia. But if
not seen as embodying implicit commitments to good and just principles, beyond majority rule, it may be difficult—in a working and
pluralistic democracy—for such a constitution to sustain itself over
time. Interpretive questions will arise even about the simple operating rules; without resort to more general principles that can attract
wide agreement to resolve these questions, the stability of the system
will be threatened. So, constitutions, to be successful in acting as a
fundamental law that normatively constrains government actors, must
include (at least implicitly) some commitments to “principles”
beyond simply the operating rules of a particular governance system.
What this means, I think, is that, at least on some issues and at
some levels, some degree of countermajoritarian “difficulty” cannot
be entirely dissolved by ongoing democratic dialogue and accountability. Even if one might argue that in a thin, operating system kind
of constitution the only “value” is that of democracy, issues will arise
that challenge the more general values implicit in this, whether those
be of human equality, or of protection of minority interests through
59
election units or other means. There is thus a continuing tension
between democracy (whether understood simply as majority rule or
as any other operating rule) and principle; in that tension and its ongoing working out lies the promise, and challenge, of constitutionalism.
Democratic accountability, participation, and dialogue are necessary, then, but not sufficient, to legitimate a constitution and its en59

To the extent interpretive questions arise, an effort to interpret a constitutional provision
in light of such a value may entail the possibility of conflict between what is claimed to be
a narrow or “literal” application of the constitutional provision as a “rule,” or an alternative reading based on a different or deeper understanding of the relevant constitutional
value (including democracy). Moreover, democracy as a value may be indeterminate on
some issues: In a federal system, for example, issues about the allocation of powers routinely can be seen to pit sub-national majorities against national majorities, in a setting in
which the principle of democracy by itself does not provide guidance on which majority
should control.
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forcement mechanisms of judicial review. Friedman suggests that diffuse support for courts corresponds to the amount of “slack” courts
60
have. Let me suggest that what political scientists call “diffuse” sup61
port might correspond to something else that we could call a commitment to being governed by principles, including the principle of
independent courts to apply those principles. So my first claim here
is that constitutionalism—and constitutions that aim to create or sustain the conditions of constitutionalism—must rest on sufficiently
good principles in addition to those of democracy and consent.
I turn now to a second set of normative questions, concerning the
implications of Friedman’s book for the practice of interpretation. I
worry that this brilliant book may be misused to argue either that 1)
the “will of the people” ought to be viewed as controlling constitutional meaning in some narrow, time-limited sense; and/or 2) that it
is only American views and experience that matter in interpreting the
U.S. Constitution. Should the Court now treat public opinion as an
independent source, like text, or original understandings, that
should be considered as such in deciding constitutional cases?
Should it exclude everything that is not “American” experience and
opinion from its ongoing evaluation of constitutional meaning?
As I said at the outset, this book ought to be understood to exclude interpretive moves, such as that in Boerne, that seek essentially
to ignore the constitutional views of the public or its legislature. One
can even remain a “judicial supremacist” without thinking it sensible
to exclude from efforts to best understand constitutional meaning
the views of the Congress. But at the same time, the adjudicative
process would not be improved if the Court were to treat public opinion as a new, independent interpretive source, for at least three reasons.
First, the effect of public opinion is both pervasive and subtle; to
explicitly treat it as a separate factor would entail some double60
61

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 379.
Diffuse support is often distinguished from specific support. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY
ET AL., PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
10 (1973) (defining “diffuse support” as a generalized attachment, while specific support
“refer[s] to the critical or favorable reactions to what the Court or individual justices have
recently done”); see also James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential
Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 537 (2003)
(explaining “diffuse support” as equivalent to “legitimacy,” a form of “institutional loyalty”
not dependent on the “immediate outputs” of the Court); cf. Gregory A. Caldeira &
James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635,
635–37 (1992) (distinguishing diffuse support among the general public, which is in
practice unrelated to specific outputs, and diffuse support among opinion leaders, whose
support for the Court is linked to more specific policy preferences).
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counting. As Bryce’s quotation above suggests, its most important
impacts may be subconscious. Second, taken as a source like “text” or
“precedent,” a “public opinion” factor is likely to give too much effect
to views that may not be enduringly reflective of considered public
will. That is, it may reflect temporary preferences of those in power
or those who are polled. Third, doing so has the potential to make
more difficult the task of treating the Constitution as a principled instrument, designed to embody claims to justice and fairness that inspire and deserve respect as fundamental law.
Although I agree with Friedman that to view constitutional law as
entirely separate from politics is both unrealistic and normatively undesirable, since the constitutional values being enforced must be
connected to the polity, at the same time what the Court does should
be, and should be seen to be, about law. Law is connected to legal
texts, to past precedents, to past, as well as present, understandings.
Given my reading of Friedman’s position, which places much more
weight on large-scale shifts in views and understandings over time
than on the year-to-year or even decade-to-decade shifts in popular
attention, conventional tools of analysis should continue to drive interpretive analyses of the Court. These conventional tools include
text, precedent, original understandings, history, structure and pur62
pose, values, and consequences.
No new theory of constitutional interpretation is required to take
account of the insights of this book. Conventional sources—
including legal understandings of the purpose of constitutional provisions, and of constitutional values, as well as of the consequences of
different interpretations—can at times be meaningfully informed by
understanding what the democratic polity thinks and how it will
react. This does not mean that “prudential” considerations ought to
drive constitutional interpretation, but that in understanding the
consequences of a decision it is important to take into account the
reactions of public officials and the public as a whole, over time. The
Constitution is about creating a working government, and a government charter enforced without regard to consequences is not likely to
survive long. In some areas, the doctrine itself permits the principled
consideration of large-scale and enduring public views (as in the
62

See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987);
Vicki C. Jackson, Multi-Valenced Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Comparisons:
An Essay in Honor of Mark Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 599 (2008); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
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Eighth Amendment’s doctrinal attention to “evolving standards of
63
decency”). In other areas, public views may have much less of a legitimate role to play (consider the protection of unpopular minority
religions).
Turning to the role of foreign law or experience, conventional interpretive analysis of the Constitution has long included—and increasingly will and should include—awareness of comparisons with other
countries, comparisons that may assist in the clarification of what U.S.
constitutional values are (whether similar or different) and that may
64
cast light on the consequences of different interpretive choices.
Friedman’s book contributes to our understanding of how perceptions of the international context have long influenced domestic con65
stitutional understandings.
He argues that in the crisis of 1937,
F.D.R.’s Court-packing plan fell on a country at a time of increased
concern about totalitarianism, a concern arising out of awareness of
events in Europe; he notes members of Congress accusing Roosevelt
of seeking the powers of a Hitler or Mussolini in trying to weaken the
66
Court’s role as a bulwark of liberty. The international context afforded a comparative mirror through which to evaluate the implications of Roosevelt’s proposal, in light of the U.S. commitment to the
principles of judicial independence and liberty.
Today, there are more relevant comparative law materials that are
more accessible than they were in the 1930s, and it is increasingly important that the constitutional democracies of the world be aware of
the constitutional experience of other countries. The United States
government sometimes acts as though the people of the United
States as a country have a stake in the internal constitutional decisions of other countries, recently demonstrated, for example, with re67
spect to Honduras.
And other countries sometimes behave as
63
64

65
66
67

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion))).
See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 103–59
(2010); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing how other countries’ “experience may . . . cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem” and arguing that European
federalisms do not support the anti-commandeering rule adopted by majority); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Address to the International
Academy of Comparative Law (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_08-02-10.html.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 218–20.
Id.
See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by President Obama and President Uribe of Colombia in Joint Press Availability (June 29, 2009), available

432

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:2

though they have a stake in our constitutional rulings, even when
their own nationals are not involved, as in filings by the E.U. in U.S.
68
death penalty cases. As the world in which we live becomes more
permeable and more mobile, the constitutional democracies of the
world do have stakes in the success of others in sustaining democratic
constitutionalism, and in the decisions of courts—and legislatures—
69
that contribute to that goal.

68

69

at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-President-Obama-andPresident-Uribe-of-Colombia-in-Joint-Press-Availability/ (remarks by President Obama)
(referring to the coup in Honduras and stating that the “coup was not legal and that President Zelaya remains the President of Honduras”); Editorial, A Way Out in Honduras, L.A.
TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A18 (reporting that President Obama called the recent actions of
the Honduras government illegal and paused U.S. aid to that country). Honduras’ actions were, at least in part, arguably in conformity with a decision of its own Supreme
Court, however, and the question of their constitutionality under the Honduras constitution has been hotly debated. Compare Doug Cassel, Honduras: Coup d’Etat in Constitutional Clothing?, ASIL INSIGHT, July 29, 2009, available at http://www.asil.org/
files/insight090729pdf.pdf (arguing that the action of the Congress in removing Zelaya
from office was plainly unlawful) with Frank M. Walsh, The Honduran Constitution Is Not a
Suicide Pact: The Legality of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya’s Removal, 38 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 339, 364–66 (2010) (arguing that because a prior amendment had inadvertently
removed provisions for an impeachment procedure, the actions of the Congress were in
accord with the spirit of the Constitution, given the threat the President posed to the
constitutional order and the rule of law by his defiance of court orders and efforts to circumvent unamendable provisions of the Constitution).
See Brief for the European Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver v.
North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), cited in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 316 n.21 (2002). In its Statement of Interest, the EU wrote:
Like the United States, the European Union (“EU”) is founded on principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule
of law. These principles are common to its fifteen member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Id. at 1. The brief continued:
The EU and its member states are opposed to the death penalty in all cases and
accordingly aim at its universal abolition. The abolition of the death penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and the progressive development
of human rights. This view has been expressed to the government of the United
States through various general demarches and through specific demarches in cases involving, inter alia, the pending execution of persons with mental retardation.
The EU and its member states pursue this policy consistently in different international fora such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe, as well as
through bilateral contacts with many countries that retain the death penalty. . . . The EU provides a special and unique perspective to this Court that is not
available through the views of the parties or other amici.
Id. at 1–2 (citing Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty, EUR.
UNION (June 3, 1998) available at www.eurunion.org/legilat/DeathPenalty/
Guidelines.htm).
See JACKSON, supra note 64, at 120, 130–31 (noting the interdependent relationships of
nations to one another in international law and in sustaining democratic constitutionalism).
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Both the “will of the people” and the judgments of the Court on
the important values of the Constitution are inevitably influenced,
positively and negatively, by our understandings of the practices and
views of other nations—both those we regard as examples of what we
do not want to be and those we regard as similarly committed to the
ideals of liberal constitutional democracy. Friedman’s book illustrates this international context in the 1930s, and, as I and others
have described, it is a factor throughout American constitutional his70
tory. But, like “public opinion,” foreign law and experience are not
necessarily “independent” factors or sources of law but rather may
help judges—and the American public—decide what they believe are
the consequences of alternative interpretations, or what controlling
U.S. constitutional values are on a matter, or on the utility of different doctrinal approaches to similar problems.
In contrast to the Court’s defensive assertions of legal autonomy—
from the U.S. Congress (and the public it represents) and from foreign experience—in the late 1990s, Friedman’s book may be taken as
an eloquent proof that the Court should not fear, but embrace,
knowledge and understanding of the contemporary world.
III. AMENDOPHOBIA, ARTICLE V AND THE “WILL OF THE PEOPLE”
One of the particularly noteworthy claims in this book is Friedman’s argument that in 1937, “we the people” agreed that the Constitution could be amended through interpretation, rather than having
to resort to the Article V process: “The true significance of
1937 . . . was plain for all to see. The American people signaled their
acceptance of judicial review as the proper way to alter the meaning
of the Constitution, but only so long as the justices’ decisions re71
mained within the mainstream of poplar understanding.”
Friedman’s claim about the meaning of the events of 1937, including
whether they marked a departure from prior periods, could be con72
tested, but he is undoubtedly correct that these events manifested a
70

71
72

See e.g., id. at 103–14; Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court
and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution,
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 196.
To note just a couple of questions about Friedman’s claim: The force of Friedman’s
claim depends in part on whether the 1937 cases represented an “alter[ation]” or
amendment to the Constitution, that is, what was being changed was “the Constitution”
rather than the Court’s erroneous interpretations of the Constitution. The suggestion
that whenever the Court overrules its own earlier decisions the Constitution has been
amended depends on a contestable merger of the jurisprudence with the Constitution it-
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significant public tolerance of change in doctrine by the Supreme
Court.
But one of the remarkable features of the history to which Friedman draws attention is the undoubtedly diminished role of formal
amendment in the constitutional conversation of that time and in
many of the decades since. The near invisibility of the amendment
process in Friedman’s book—the relatively slight attention given, for
example, to the Nineteenth Amendment, the Civil War Amendments,
or to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments—is perhaps understandable because, as Friedman shows, interpretation has played
so important a role in the process of constitutional change and adjustment and because his book is, after all, focused on the Supreme
Court and public opinion. Indeed, Friedman’s book may be read as a
powerful account of how, as a historical matter, interpretation has
come to supplant amendment as the method of choice for constitutional contest and change: the apparent responsiveness of the Court
to elected officials and public views may have persuaded many that
formal amendment is not necessary.
The history told here thus may reinforce a normative disposition
to oppose or discount the possibility of amendments of the Constitution even when considerable numbers of the people believe an im73
portant change is required. Take, for example, Citizens United. In
that case the Court, 5-4, overruled two earlier decisions to hold that
Congress lacked power to prohibit or limit the independent expenditures of corporations made on behalf of political candidates. The two
74
decisions overruled were Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, de75
cided in 1990, and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, decided

73
74

75

self. Moreover, in the period after 1937, resort to the amendment process remained an
apparent possibility both in actions in the Congress (some of which led to Amendments
XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, and XXVI), and in efforts by state courts and legislatures to
procure amendments in response to Warren Court decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. See
generally Ross, supra note 16, at 484, 528–52 (describing three proposed amendments
sponsored by states’ rights proponents). The failure of the Court-packing plan, furthermore, has been explained by some as being in part a rejection of Roosevelt’s perceived
high-handedness or as reflecting fear of an American dictatorship, rather than Court veneration or an embrace of a particular role of the Court. See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME
POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 503 (2010).
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
494 U.S. 652, 666, 668 (1990) (upholding section 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign
Finance Act, which restricts corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures in connection with state candidate elections, against First Amendment
and Equal Protection Clause challenges).
540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003) (upholding section 203 of The Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BRCA) and its extension of restrictions on corporate independent expenditures in connection with federal elections to include all “electioneering contributions”).
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only seven years earlier in 2003. The Citizens United decision has occasioned considerable controversy, and public opinion polling suggests that between 60% and 80% of voters disapproved the decision
76
and favored limits on campaign expenditures by corporate entities.
One might have thought that with this level of disapproval, on a recent decision that overruled previously settled law, a constitutional
amendment would at least be considered as a response. Although
some members of Congress have sponsored or proposed constitu77
tional amendments, the weight of the effort by those who disagree
78
with the decision has been in other directions.
Although some
79
NGOs have raised amendment as a possible avenue to explore, oth76

77

78

79

See Monica Youn, Citizens United: The Aftermath, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, 1–2 (June 2010),
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/C21/Issue%20Briefs/ACS%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20Youn
%20Citizens%20United.pdf (describing results of polls by Washington Post-ABC News,
Pew, Common Cause, and People for the American Way, taken a month or so after the
Court’s decision). Of the two polls that broke down responses by political affiliation, a
clear majority of both Democrats and Republicans opposed the decision, with opposition
highest among those who describe themselves as independents. See id. A poll by People
for the American Way found “78% believed that corporations should be limited in how
much they can spend to influence elections, and 70% believed corporations already have
too much influence over elections.” Id. at 1.
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 74, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing a constitutional amendment permitting Congress and the States to regulate “expenditure of funds by corporations engaging in political speech,” introduced by Congresswoman Donna Edwards of Maryland, with
twenty-five cosponsors); Press Release, Senator Max Baucus, Baucus Statement on Campaign Finance Ruling (Oct. 18, 2010), available at
http://baucus.senate.gov/
?p=press_release&id=222 (describing Senator Baucus’ proposed constitutional amendment to authorize regulation of corporate and union campaign contributions and expenditures). For an earlier proposal by Senator Charles Schumer, with bipartisan cosponsorship, see S.J. Res. 21, 110th Cong. (2007), proposing a constitutional amendment
authorizing Congress and the States to “regulate the raising and spending of money, including through setting limits” for elections and, in the case of states, referenda, initiatives and similar ballot measures.
See e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act
(DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); Democracy is Strengthened by Casting
Light on Spending in Elections Act (DISCLOSE Act), S. 3295, 111th Cong. (2010);
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010); Fair Elections Now
Act, H.R. 1826, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Citizens United: Waking
a Sleeping Giant, BUS. ETHICS, (Oct. 21, 2010), http://business-ethics.com/2010/
10/21/1304-citizens-united-waking-a-sleeping-giant.
But cf. PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY,
http://www.pfaw.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (urging support for the “DISCLOSE”
Act, a proposed statute to require disclosure of corporate campaign spending, while also
urging support for a constitutional amendment). For proposals for a new constitutional
convention, see CALL CONVENTION, http://www.callaconvention.org/ (last visited Nov.
14, 2010) (promoting a constitutional convention from which legislators are excluded
and referring specifically to the need for campaign finance reform).
See, e.g., FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, www.freespeechforpeople.org (last visited Nov. 14,
2010) (advocating a constitutional amendment in response to Citizens United); PLEDGE TO
PROTECT AM.’S DEMOCRACY, http://www.pledgefordemocracy.org (last visited Nov. 14,
2010) (website established by People for the American Way and Public Citizen) (seeking
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ers seem to avoid it conspicuously. For example, a recent paper, written by a senior counsel for campaign finance to the Brennan Center’s
Democracy Project, explains why the decision is an incorrect reading
of the First Amendment and what the adverse consequences of the
decision could be for the quality of American democracy. It recommends a three-fold strategy to overcome its effects: a focus on new
interpretive approaches, a focus on various forms of new legislation
(including public campaign finance), and work on judicial appoint80
ments. Nowhere in this thoughtful paper, however, is the possibility
of constitutional amendment even broached.
This kind of silence about amendment is symptomatic of what I
would term a fear of constitutional amendments, an “amendophobia,” especially on the left. Fifteen years ago, after the Republican victories in the midterm 1994 elections led to a spate of proposed constitutional amendments being introduced or considered in the
Congress, Kathleen Sullivan wrote a paper about what she called
“amendmentitis”—a propensity, as she described it, to rush to constitutional amendment to solve problems that could be addressed legislatively or (worse) should not be addressed by law, and especially not
81
entrenched law. She identified five reasons to operate on a presumption against amending the constitution: constitutional stability,
the rule of law, constitutional coherence, the benefits of constitution82
al generality, and preserving the role of the Supreme Court. Many

80

81
82

pledges to support a constitutional amendment to overturn holdings that corporations
have the same First Amendment rights as citizens).
See Youn, supra note 76, at 9–18 (emphasizing need to build legal records to meet “compelling interest” test, to develop interpretive approaches focused on voters, and to enact
new legislation to provide disclosure and advance public financing); id. at 20 (emphasizing importance of new judges with conception of the First Amendment different from
that of the Roberts Court majority).
See supra note 10; see also Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography,
42 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1354-59 (1990).
See generally Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, supra note 10. Sullivan’s points about
stability seem spot on: If a constitution is to serve as a basic framework for an ongoing legal system, and especially if it is to serve as an object of affection and loyalty, it must be
seen as an enduring document. But while the rule of law might be threatened by too
many changes in law too fast, it is not clear why the rule of law is less threatened by
change through litigation and interpretation than by change through formal amendment; indeed, since Article V specifies in writing the amendment procedure, one might
think that, along traditional rule of law conceptions, change by amendment would be
preferred.
Sullivan’s argument from coherence—that the Constitution was conceived as a
whole, such that changes in one part may affect others—raises a good caution, but overall
seems less persuasive as a reason not to amend. First, it may be based on an overstatement of the degree of coherence in the original document. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1285–306 (1999) (discussing
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of the arguments have considerable force: Very frequent amendment
of a constitution may detract from its overall stability and the habits
of the rule of law (which are closely related to the interests in stability), and could undermine the Supreme Court’s role in protecting individual rights and liberties.
Too frequent amendment (or too many highly specific amendments) might also diminish the force of the Constitution itself as a
“symbol” of the nation and its commitments to constitutional democracy, as argued by a bipartisan group put together by the Constitution
Project and the Twentieth Century Fund to establish proposed guidelines for the kinds of issues that should be dealt with by amendment,
83
rather than by legislation. This bipartisan committee took the view
that, because constitutional amendments bind future generations,
which generally should be able to re-examine contested policies in
light of future experience, restraint is appropriate; the Prohibition
Amendment is in their view a paradigm of an imprudent and inap84
propriate amendment. On campaign finance, however, one might

83

84

“bricolage” in constitution-drafting and its implications for coherence-based interpretive
approaches). Second, it ignores the effects of intervening amendments that changed
prior structures or relationships in dramatic ways. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII. Professor Sullivan’s argument on coherence grounds against a balanced budget amendment seemed particularly subject to question, since Congress’s
modern authority to tax arguably derives in important part from the Sixteenth Amendment, adopted long after the original Constitution.
Embedded within Sullivan’s argument on coherence is a different one, particularly
concerned with the Bill of Rights. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy, supra note 10, at
699-700. Is it particularly important not to encourage amendments to the Bill of Rights?
This argument gives one real pause. To the extent that a bill of rights is intended to protect those who are unpopular, there is good reason to make their amendment difficult.
Cf. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74(2) (establishing a somewhat more rigorous procedure to
amend the Bill of Rights chapter than for some other kinds of amendment). But even if
this argument provides a good reason for a presumption against amending the Bill of
Rights in response to Court decisions, it surely does not support an absolute bar.
Sullivan is also right, I think, that if the Constitution is too easily or often amended,
the role of the Court in protecting its values accordingly diminishes. However, Sullivan’s
objections generally do not help discriminate between amendments that ought to be pursued and those that should not. They can be understood to support an important precautionary principle that the effects of an amendment across the Constitution must be
considered before an amending process is undertaken.
See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, “GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS”:
DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 4–5 (1999) (arguing that amending the Constitution too often or with “the detailed specificity of an ordinary statute”
would decrease the document’s symbolic importance); cf. Michelman, supra note 81, at
1362-64 (advancing the “idea that the Constitution is in some sense a picture of ‘us’”).
See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83, at 3–4. Their report also suggests that
a proposed campaign finance amendment of the 1990s should be seen merely as a “response to contemporary political pressures” and not about an “enduring” problem. Id. at
11. Yet two generations have come of age between 1976, when Buckley was decided, and
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look at the Court’s decisions since Buckley v. Valeo, in 1976, as “binding future” generations to a highly contested understanding of constitutional meaning on a point of real moment. The Prohibition
Amendment, moreover, established a directive rule on an issue of social policy, prohibiting the manufacture or distribution of intoxicating beverages; an amendment that overcomes a Court decision in order to empower (but not require) governments to regulate
electioneering by corporations would not prohibit or mandate a par86
ticular course of action.
The idea that amendment should not be the first response to a
decision with which one disagrees seems quite sound, especially in a
complex democracy with a deeply entrenched constitution. However, the fact that very frequent amendments will have negative consequences does not address the question of whether an occasional
amendment will have such consequences. And the terms of amending the U.S. Constitution are so difficult that—at least if history is a
good predictor—there may be greater risks of too infrequent, than of
too frequent, amendment. To suggest that too much or too easy
amendment is a bad thing does not imply that the Constitution
should never be amended nor even give that much guidance on
when it should and should not be. Politically eschewing amendment
may cede an important democratic tool, manifesting a fear of the
people and of democratic self-government that in the long run may

85

86

2010, when Citizens United was, and the problems of expense and influence in campaign
spending have certainly not diminished in that time. Rounds of congressional legislation—no easy matter to achieve—involving efforts to regulate campaign spending have
been repeatedly rebuffed by the Court on constitutional grounds. Whether statutory
means have been exhausted is not clear, but the efficacy of alternative forms of regulation
that would survive constitutional scrutiny under prevailing standards is also unclear.
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down campaign expenditure limits of the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 [FECA]); see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding restrictions on independent corporate treasury expenditures unconstitutional); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
456 (2007) (holding electioneering limits of McCain-Feingold law unconstitutional as
applied to speech other than “express advocacy”); Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding provisions of the FECA unconstitutional
as applied to nonprofit advocacy group’s speech).
Cf. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83, at 12–13 (distinguishing between
power granting amendments “necessary . . . [to] eliminate constitutional barriers” to legislation and amendments that “restrict the scope of democratic participation by future
generations”). On this account, an amendment authorizing regulation may be seen in
important respects to enhance the democratic character of the Constitution—assuming
that there are adequate checks on such a power not being used for incumbency protection or otherwise abused.
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be self-defeating. For Friedman’s book also might be read to suggest that, whether progressive or conservative, results on divisive issues in constitutional law cannot in the long run be sustained without
political support.
Many Americans take pride in the longevity of their Constitution,
viewing the Framers as having brought wisdom and publicspiritedness towards its creation. Most Americans understand that if
the courts have concluded that something is a matter of right, that
conclusion must be respected, without necessarily agreeing that
88
rights exist only through judicial recognition. The Constitution was
designed to be difficult to amend; many believe that difficulty has
contributed to the stability and (relative) continuity of our constitutional democracy and to the influence of and respect for Supreme
Court decisions as representing the law to which obedience is owed.
But admiration and affection for a constitution can become a disabling, disempowering form of perfectionism, a belief that instead of
being a product produced by imperfect humans, the text should be
regarded as a sacred vessel that should not be tampered with by the
89
mere mortals of the present age. Respect for the Supreme Court,
which is essential to securing compliance with its judgments and to
enabling the Court to play a settlement function in limiting the

87

88
89

See Michelman, supra note 81, at 1359 (expressing concern that opposition to any
amendment of the Constitution may “connive with a terribly sad constitutional
fate. . . . [helping to] make our political world . . . all distrust and no democracy”).
“I got my rights!” is a phrase that might represent an assertion of popular understanding
and authority.
Cf. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-17 (1988) (discussing the Constitution
as a “sacred object”); Robin L. West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765, 791–92
(1992) (arguing that the failure to debate the value of the Constitution has had negative
effects); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kerchecal (July 12, 1816), in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 557–58 (M. Peterson ed., 1975) (suggesting that every
twenty years or so the Constitution should be amended). In this letter, Jefferson also expressed the following view:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of
the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be
beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It
deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from
the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws
and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical
means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions
must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.
Id. at 558–59.
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90

points of continuing and divisive controversy, can nonetheless pass
the point of being healthy in a democracy.
Much of the academic literature assumes the primacy of the Supreme Court and focuses on critique or explanation of its decisions
with a view to preserving or reforming its doctrine. Other scholars
criticize the primacy of the Court, but in radical terms—“taking the
Constitution away” from the Court, or other arguments to prevent
the Court from reviewing the constitutionality of legislation—that do
not engage with questions of stability and amendment, perhaps because they are prepared to jettison a much larger part of our ongoing
91
system. For those who do not seek to abolish judicial review, but believe that ruling out amendment as a response to seriously incorrect
decisions is inappropriate, the hard questions are what kinds of issues
92
warrant invocation of the amendment process.
These are hard
questions precisely because there is so much to the point that too
many or too frequent amendments will have potentially adverse effects; and the empirical effects of more frequent amendment are untested.
Constitutional veneration should not exclude amendment. As Article V suggests, the Court was never intended to have the final word
on all matters constitutional. At least five amendments have become
part of the Constitution to respond to or overrule Supreme Court decisions: the Eleventh Amendment (1798), which overruled Chisholm
v. Georgia’s holding concerning the Court’s jurisdiction over debt ac93
tions against states; the Thirteenth Amendment (1865), outlawing
slavery and thus responding to Dred Scott v. Sanford’s holding that
94
Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery by statute; the Fourteenth
Amendment (1868), overruling Dred Scott’s pernicious interpretation

90

91
92

93

94

See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (1997). But see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED
CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2001)
(arguing that the function of judicial review is to resist or “unsettle” results achieved by
the political branches of government).
See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 56.
For an effort to systematize thinking about the choice between common law adjudication
or formal amendments, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the
Constitutional Common Law, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. XI (abrogating Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
which upheld the Court’s original jurisdiction in a suit on a contract by a citizen of one
state against another state).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451–52 (1857).
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of African-Americans as outside the citizenry of the United States;
the Sixteenth Amendment (1913), responding to the Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co. decision concerning the constitutionality of a
96
federal income tax; and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (1971) to
overrule a portion of the decision in Oregon v. Mitchell holding that
Congress lacked power to extend the vote to eighteen-year-olds in
97
state elections. The Nineteenth Amendment, moreover, rectified
the constitutional status of women that had been reflected in such
late-nineteenth-century decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment
98
as Minor v. Happersett. Has the time come for the American people
once again to express their disagreement with the Court over a fundamental aspect of American constitutionalism?
Maybe so. The decision prohibiting regulation of direct corporate
expenditures on behalf of, or in opposition to, particular candidates
makes a significant change in the structure of American election
finance law—a structure that has been in place since well before the
campaign finance reforms of the 1970s. As early as 1907, Congress
99
banned corporate political contributions to candidates. In the TaftHartley Act of 1947, Congress extended the ban to any expenditures
by corporations to cover not only direct contributions but also inde100
pendent expenditures.
Such provisions—in place for more than
sixty years—are now undone.
The consequences of the decision are not easy to predict; it is
possible that there will not be significant change in corporate spending, but it is also possible that business corporations will take up the
101
opportunity that the Court’s ruling provides.
If they do, the risks
are considerable.
95

96
97
98

99
100
101

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406–27, 454 (holding that under the Constitution, African Americans could not be considered citizens as they were excluded from
the original concept of “the people”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895)
(holding that an income tax was unconstitutional).
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 124-30 (1970) (Black,
J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (stating that the right to vote shall not be denied on account
of sex); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875) (rejecting a woman’s
constitutional claim to be entitled to vote, holding that the Constitution does not prohibit states from allowing only men to vote in elections).
Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441(b) (2006)).
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§ 304, 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60.
Many, though not all, commentators are of the view that the effect of Citizens United will
be to increase the impact of corporate spending in election campaigns, including, in particular, campaigns for elected judicial office in the states. See, e.g., James Sample, Court
Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010); Adam Liptak,
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The use of enormous concentrations of wealth, made possible because of legal fictions designed to facilitate the accumulation of capital in a market economy, to directly influence democratic elections
arguably undermines the primacy of voter equality. Markets and political democracy may reinforce each other in healthy ways; but unrestrained corporate spending to elect, or defeat, candidates for public
office arguably threatens the premise of political democracy, that is,
of the equal standing of each voter. The risks of allowing such corporate expenditures increases the likelihood of business interests having
legislators who are “bought and paid for,” accountable primarily to
business interests, rather than voters. It is already a challenge for
many members of legislatures to think independently about the public interest when they must raise money from many individuals to
fund their election campaigns. But although individual access to
wealth varies greatly, candidates who can appeal widely to many
people of ordinary income still have a shot. “Independent” corporate
expenditures can be made in opposition to an incumbent candi102
date, in ways that afford opportunities for influence comparable to
those created by direct donations; a threat to support an opponent
may be a powerful negative incentive to an incumbent legislator. Allowing direct corporate expenditures of this sort (even if nominally
“independent”) may well result in our democracy having many more
103
legislators who feel beholden primarily to business interests.

102

103

Former Justice O’Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A16
(reporting Justice O’Connor’s views); Richard Hasen, Bad News for Judicial Elections, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/howcorporate-money-will-reshape-politics. Others are somewhat less troubled. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 24,
2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/what-should-congress-do-about-citizensunited (stating, “I share neither the jubilant sense that the First Amendment has scored a
major triumph over misbegotten censorship nor the apocalyptic sense that the Court has
ushered in an era of corporate dominance that threatens to drown out the voices of all
but the best-connected and to render representative democracy all but meaningless,” especially in light of experience in those states that had not restricted corporate spending
in state elections; calling for improved laws on disclosure). And some praise the decision.
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, More Messages, More Sources, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/how-corporate-money-willreshape-politics/ (praising the decision as leveling the playing field between media and
other business corporations).
See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17)(B) (defining an expenditure as “independent” if it is “not made in
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of [a] candidate, the candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its
agents”).
I do not consider here the possibility, proposed by some scholars, for required anonymity
in contributions. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 6 (2002).
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Moreover, if the opportunities created by the Court’s decision are
fully exploited they risk a progression to a culture of corruption—
legalized corruption to be sure—in American politics and business.
Given corporate profits, the costs of buying elections may seem small.
Is there a risk of increased expenditures on political campaigns in an
escalating arms race of corporate interest (the technology industry
versus agriculture, for example) to have their favored candidates in
office? If so, this might enhance the impact of corporate money, to
the detriment of ordinary voters and possibly to the detriment of the
market economy: If businesses begin to focus more resources and attention on purchasing political power, their focus on market performance and innovation may decline.
Is it time to consider amending the Constitution to restore legislative authority to regulate (or prohibit) corporate expenditures in
elections? There are, to be sure, serious risks in pursuing such a
course, to be discussed below. Yet there may be countervailing reasons to at least give real consideration to an amendment as a response to Citizens United, in addition to or in place of some of the statutory or other measures being proposed. For it is possible that the
changes that could ensue from this decision would be selfentrenching, in ways that would defeat the possibility for later political correction through ordinary lawmaking or constitutional
amendments insofar as they require legislative passage. And refusing
to consider amendment as one way to respond to a course of Supreme Court decisions that are believed to be incorrect on so significant a question unnecessarily removes an important democratic element of accountability from the socio-legal context of the
Constitution as a whole.
First, on the possibility of self-entrenching corporate and political
behaviors: If corporate spending increases in the ways permitted by
this ruling, and if more legislators feel under the influence of corporate interests (at least to the extent of having to avoid having them
fund their opponents), it may become increasingly difficult to find
legislators willing to propose either an amendment or legislation that
might pass judicial scrutiny. Legislators who have grown to fear the
possibility of large corporate spending to secure their defeat at the
next election are very unlikely to be willing to promote legislation or
constitutional amendments that corporations disapprove of, whether
in campaign spending or on matters of substantive policy. Corporate
political action committees (“PACs”) may have some of this potential,
but the amount of funds available through corporate treasuries and
the greater ease of their use raise the possibility of a much greater
corporate role in elections in the future than we have at present.
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And the potential for such self-entrenching effects of corporate
spending—freed from regulation by the Court’s decision—is a special
factor favoring judicial overruling (not to be expected) or amendment, and sooner rather than later.
Second, on democracy: The Constitution represents, as most constitutions do, a balance between commitments to democracy (in the
sense that the people of the polity retain the power ultimately to control its course) and commitment to sound principles of design and
aspirations to justice, including the principle of judicial independence. The provisions for amending the Constitution are plainly
written and specific, suggesting that enacting an amendment violates
no rule of law conception of the Constitution as a stable governing
instrument. The amendment process of Article V requires that multiple majorities in many locations must be convinced of the need to
act—whether in response to a judicial decision or otherwise—before
104
a change in the text can be made.
Although the amendment
process has been criticized for being too rigid (in the sense of demanding more supermajorities than many other modern constitutions), it surely cannot be faulted for making amendment too easy.
Friedman’s book offers an important set of explanations for why evolution in the law by interpretation is not inconsistent with democracy;
but it offers no claim that evolution by interpretation is more democratically legitimate than change that is made by constitutional
amendment.
Political fights about who is appointed to the Court are a much
more indirect way for a democratic polity to redirect constitutional
law; they also permit constitutional law to be redirected (perhaps for
long periods) based on what may be relatively short-term political
shifts in the Presidency and the Senate, in some contrast to the kind
of mass political action required to initiate and succeed in the
amendment process. As will be noted below, there may be sociocultural costs of moving to amend, especially of moving to amend a
rights-protecting part of the Constitution, costs that may affect the
willingness of the Court and our society in the future to protect the
104

Requiring multiple and/or supermajority votes is perhaps not a bad procedural indicia of
the kind of issue on which amendments should be sought, although substantive criteria
might also play a role in guiding those dissatisfied with a judicial decision as to when to
seek to invoke this process and when not to. On procedure: If one were drafting an
amendment process today, greater care might be taken to assure that there is a national
population majority in the second phase of that process and that this majority has some
degree of generational contemporaneousness. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION ch.
VIII, § 128 (requiring a majority of the states and a majority vote of the entire population
to amend the constitution).
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rights of those with whom public officials or a majority of the population disagrees. But there are also costs to the democratic spirit and
the foundation of the Constitution in public consent to ruling
105
amendment out.
Kathleen Sullivan distinguished, in her attack on “amendmentitis,” “structural” reasons from more transitory ones, recognizing that
structural concerns about the entrenchment of political power might
106
appropriately support amendment.
There is a serious argument
that the effects of corporate spending on the democratic, representative quality of our elected officials represents a significant “structural”
reason for amendment. In the context of interpretation and invalidation of legislation, John Hart Ely famously argued for judicial restraint except when there was good reason to believe the political
process would not self-correct, whether because of prejudice against
minorities or because of existing and entrenched obstructions to the
107
proper working of the democratic process. The suggestion here is
that invoking the constitutional amendment process—and the related higher degree of public involvement that it can occasion—may
be appropriate where a Court decision itself has the effect of entrenching obstructions to the working of the democratic process in
108
ways that will prevent that process from self-correcting in the future.
Yet, as discussed below, the potential that such an amendment could
have an adverse effect on the constitutional protections for a vibrant
democracy must also be considered.
As noted above, there are a number of serious objections and
possible risks to the course of seeking an amendment. Will an
amendment in response to a decision concerning “rights” under the
First Amendment be interpreted by the Court to have radiating effects in enhancing government powers over speech more generally?
Will an amendment in response to a Court decision “chasten” or intimidate the Court into not taking other decisions it fears will be unpopular? Will enacting an amendment in this circumstance encour-
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107
108

Cf. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty (May 21, 1944) in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960) (“Liberty lies in
the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can
even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to
save it.”).
See sources cited supra note 10.
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
See generally CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83 (discussing guidelines for
constitutional amendments that make our system of government more politically responsive).
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age disrespect for the Constitution, or lead to a plethora of amendments that could be destabilizing? Would it open up other issues for
amendment that opponents of Citizens United would not want to see?
Efforts to enact a constitutional amendment might be viewed by
some as an undesirable concession that Citizens United was correctly
decided. Is this a substantial reason not to seek an amendment? Was
it a mistake to seek a child labor amendment in response to Hammer
109
v. Dagenhart? The effort to seek amendment did not prevent later
successful efforts to change doctrine, in the movement from Hammer
to the later New Deal cases. Likewise, the effort to obtain enactment
of the Equal Rights Amendment may have facilitated the adoption of
reasonably serious review of gender discrimination. True, the pendency of an amendment movement might be taken by some Justices
110
as a reason for caution in moving away from the prior decision; but
at the same time, its progress in the states might also help persuade
others to rethink their understandings.
Second, as noted above, if an amendment were successful, important concerns about the scope of its interpretive effects across the
whole Constitution would have to be considered. There is no doubt
some uncertainty. Narrowly crafted amendments have on occasion
111
been read very broadly; but in some ways the existence of a text may
109

110

111

247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute prohibiting the shipment
in interstate commerce of goods made through child labor), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941).
Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (holding a
statutory gender classification unconstitutional). In his separate opinion, Justice Powell
disagreed with the plurality’s view that gender classifications should be subject to the
strictest form of scrutiny, and referred to the pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment
as a reason not to adopt a “compelling state interest” test for strict scrutiny of gender classifications. He wrote:
The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this
precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratification by the States. If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the will of
the people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. By acting
prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment. It seems to
me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision
which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for
duly prescribed legislative processes.
Id.
The Court’s Eleventh Amendment case law provides an example. Ever since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (concluding that the Amendment, which in terms prohibited
suits by out-of-state citizens against a state, also precluded suits by a state’s own citizens
against the state), the Amendment has been read to stand for far more than its literal
language embraces. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (“To rest on the
words of the Amendment alone would be to engage in the type of ahistorical literalism we
have rejected in [the past . . . .]”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54
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merely provide an occasion for movement in an unexpected direction. In the first generation or so it seems likely that an amendment
will be read to do what it was intended to do; after that, the realm of
constitutional interpretive politics will require engagement to assure
that its use is appropriate. There may well be risks that the amendment will have “radiating” effects, and would in the future be interpreted to permit greater government regulation of other forms of
speech, or alternatively, of spending on other activities protected by
112
the Constitution. This would count as a worry, one that can be addressed—but without guarantees of success—by careful drafting of
the amendment and its supporting explanations.
Third, it might be argued that resort to the difficult and time consuming amendment process should not be pursued until other, statutory approaches are exhausted; or that pursuing an amendment will
sap political energy away from a more attainable and equally, if not
more, effective legislative solution. Is there a principle of good constitutional behavior (or what we might call “pro-constitutional behavior”) not to resort to amendment until it is clear that statutory fixes
won’t work? There is much to be said for that kind of presumption,
for many of the reasons Sullivan discussed. But, as indicated above,
there is at least some reason to worry that what we are facing may be a
change in practice by business corporations that, if it gets going in
substantial terms, may become entrenched in American politics in
ways that over time will make it more and more difficult to undo and
that may affect a wide range of issues on which business interests are
in play. And it seems quite unclear whether efforts to mobilize support for an amendment will sap energy from legislative fixes rather
than generate it.
Some raise objections to amending the First Amendment that
draw on both institutional and substantive concerns as follows: The
protection of freedom of speech is central to the viability of a robust
democracy; the temptations to governments to stifle such speech are

112

(1996) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what
it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.” (quoting Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991))). For a related example see Michelman, supra note 81, at 1360-61, noting the possibility that a narrowly crafted flag-burning
amendment might “unravel the whole fabric of first amendment doctrine,” in discussing
Walter Dellinger’s testimony opposing a constitutional amendment to overturn the
Court’s flag-burning case law. See also infra note 124.
Cf. Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn’t Speech 19 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, Working Paper, No. 2010-18), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586377 (discussing how
regulation of expenditures to engage in constitutionally protected activity is distinct from
regulating the protected activity itself).
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well known; courts are the institutions least likely to require and most
likely to protect against curtailment of speech in ways that damage
the democratic process; and thus, in order to maintain a culture of
robust and competitive speech a “prophylactic” approach must be
taken that includes strong presumptions to avoid direct challenges
(whether through amendment or otherwise) of judicial decisions enforcing rights of free speech (however erroneous those decisions are
113
believed to be). This syllogism could be attacked. But even if one
grants this set of arguments, there remains the question whether an
occasion has arisen in which that presumption should be overcome.
Although the First Amendment’s language plainly implies protections of the ability of individuals, and the press, to speak freely, its
language alone is silent on whether freedom of speech means the
freedom of business corporations to spend unregulated amounts of
treasury money to do so. Indeed the text alone, with its specific pro114
tection of the “press,” might be read to imply otherwise. The Court
having interpreted the First Amendment to prohibit legislative regulation of corporate treasury expenditures on behalf of, or opposed to,
particular candidates in particular elections, an amendment to address this narrow, but important, question should not be beyond the
capacity of good lawyers to draft in ways that do not impair the
Court’s capacity or inclination to enforce protections of individual
speech rights—including the ability of individuals to pool their resources, as in PACs, or political parties, or membership associations
115
to amplify individual voices through collective action.
Although
113

114

115

For example, some might argue that the courts are no less likely to suppress speech than
the other branches, but only that their opportunities to do so are more curtailed. Or it
might be argued that prophylaxis is unnecessary or imposes other costs that are too high.
See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (noting that the press
is “the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection”).
But cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797–801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (rejecting idea that press clause confers special status on press).
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 452 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Freedom of expression embraces more than the right of an individual to speak his mind. It includes also
his right to advocate and his rights to join with his fellows in an effort to make that advocacy
effective.” (emphasis added)). Although the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
generally does not distinguish among rights claimants based on their individual, associational, or corporate status, the character of a regulated entity as a for-profit business, rather than as an individual or a real membership association of a not-for-profit character
that is concerned with advancing social or political purposes, may be relevant to the legitimate justifications of government action in some First Amendment contexts. See Austin
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665–66 (1990) (distinguishing among entities subject to regulation of their political expenditures based on their purposes, on
whether their members or shareholders have incentives to disassociate from political acts
they disagree with and on whether they are independent from influence by business corporations), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010);
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many are attached and attracted to the clarity of the First Amendment’s command, “Congress shall make no law,” it is equally clear
that what “no law” means has been subject to considerable judicial interpretation. Some laws prohibiting speech (i.e., obscene speech,
fraudulent speech) are permitted, so the “no law” part of the
Amendment functions as a strong exhortation and presumption
more than an operative rule. That is, interpretation of the First
Amendment has resulted in a jurisprudence whose complexity belies
the apparent clarity of the “make no law” language. The idea sometimes propounded, that an amendment would be the first “exception” to the principle of free speech, ignores the judicially recognized
exceptions—for fraud, for obscenity, for defamation—long accepted.
There are, to be sure, important technical and legal challenges to
drafting an amendment that would accomplish its goals without overempowering legislatures. First, there may be important issues of substance on which proponents of an amendment disagree, concerning
both the intended scope of a proposed amendment, and the best way
116
to craft it, on which agreement would need to be reached. Wheth-

116

Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding
FECA limits on corporate treasury expenditures in elections unconstitutional as applied
to a nonprofit public interest group’s expenditures). Compare Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85–88 (1980) (upholding state law prohibiting bans on public expressive activities in shopping centers against claim by shopping center of First Amendment right to exclude such activities on its property), with Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (invalidating state anti-discrimination law as applied to prohibit
Scouts from excluding gay scout leaders as a violation of their First Amendment associational rights) and Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581–82 (2000) (invalidating state law requiring “blanket” primaries from which political parties could not exclude
voters from outside the party).
Some might favor broader proposals designed to permit regulation of all corporate
speech that the Court has found prohibited by the First Amendment. See We the People?
Corporate Spending in America After Citizens United: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Jeffrey Clements, General Counsel of Free
Speech for People) (criticizing corporate speech doctrines more generally). Others
might disagree: Even if one does not conceive of corporations as having rights like human beings, one can conceive of government attacking or suppressing corporate speech,
because it disagrees, in ways that would diminish the vibrancy of our discourse. Moreover, it may be that some corporations would be willing to have a uniform rule in place
that would prohibit them—and their competitors—from using corporate money to fund
election campaigns. Corporations will not readily give up their other speech rights but
might be quite happy to be relieved of the need to respond in election after election to
candidate expectations of (if not requests for) expenditures. That is, a more narrowlytailored amendment might appeal to the enlightened self-interest of business corporations in obtaining a uniform rule that would bind their competitors and take the issue of
direct expenditures to influence elections off the table. For discussion of some of the political dynamics and advantages of amendment processes, see Mary Ziegler, Ways to
Change: A Reevaluation of Article V Campaigns and Legislative Constitutionalism, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 969.
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er an amendment should authorize the regulation of all speech by
“corporations,” or of all “political speech” by corporations (along the
lines offered by Maryland Congresswoman Donna Edwards in House
117
Joint Resolution 74) , or only of corporate expenditures for “electioneering” activities on behalf of or in opposition to candidates for
public office, raise difficult questions. On any approach, maintaining
an exception for legitimate press activities would seem essential to the
health of a democratic polity; if such an amendment, with such an
exception, were to become law, it would be far more important than
it has been up to now for legislatures and courts to provide definition
to the contours of “the press,” a challenge of translation forward from
the presses of the eighteenth century to the twenty-first-century multimedia journalistic complex, including online reporting and the
118
“free press” role of blogs. There are risks of an amendment being
read both too narrowly and too broadly: too narrow a reading, such
as that given the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
119
Amendment through the Slaughter-house Cases, would allow Congress and the state legislatures too little room for legislation; too
broad a reading might allow too much room for regulation of campaign finance and, as noted earlier, possibly loosen the constraints on
government regulation of speech across a much broader swathe.
Thus, much would depend on the scope, clarity, and understood
meanings of a proposed amendment. For example, one current proposal for an amendment states that “Congress and the States may regulate the expenditure of funds for political speech by any corpora120
tion, limited liability company, or other corporate entity.” Imagine
that a future city council prohibited corporate expenditures for
speech in favor of “tax free zones,” but not other corporate speech;
or imagine, perhaps more remotely, a prohibition on corporate
speech on behalf of Republicans, but not speech on behalf of Demo117

118

119
120

H.R.J. Res. 74, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. (2010). The operative language of the proposed
amendment reads as follows:
Section 1. The sovereign right of the people to govern being essential to a free
democracy, Congress and the States may regulate the expenditure of funds for political speech by any corporation, limited liability company, or other corporate entity.
Section 2. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to abridge the
freedom of the press.
On translation, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171–73
(1993) (analogizing the practice of faithfully interpreting laws over time to the practice of
translation in language). Just as the Fourth Amendment’s ban on searches and seizures
was translated forward to apply to electronic eavesdropping and oversight, so too the
eighteenth-century concept of the press is capable of being translated forward.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
H.R.J. Res. 74; see supra note 117.
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crats: Would the language of this amendment be read to shelter such
regulations from attack as violations of the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution? Is there a risk that such an
amendment would be construed as a plenary grant of authority not
subject to limitations by any already existing provisions of the Consti121
tution?
Would an amendment drafted, instead, to say “The First Amendment
shall not be construed to prohibit Congress and the states from regulating the expenditure of funds for political speech by any corporation,”
better avoid this risk? Would it allow more room for a court to prohibit, as a violation of the due process or equal protection standards,
such partisan (and, in current First Amendment lingo, “viewpoint122
based”) distinctions? Or would this version (or perhaps other versions) of such a hypothetical amendment allow too much room for
courts to use other clauses of the Constitution to re-impose most or
121

122

Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with the Court’s First Amendment analysis of the constitutionality of
a “hate speech” statute and arguing that “[a] defamation statute that drew distinctions on
the basis of political affiliation or ‘an ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene
works that contain criticism of the city government,’ [quoting the majority] would unquestionably fail rational-basis review” under the Equal Protection Clause).
An alternative might be an amendment whose first section went something like this:
The First Amendment shall not be construed to prohibit Congress and the states
from regulating the expenditure of funds for political speech or communications,
on behalf of or in opposition to the election of one or more candidates for public
office, by any corporation.
Narrowing the grant of authority to the regulation of corporate expenditures of
funds for electioneering activity would leave existing First Amendment protections of other
corporate speech on political issues in place. For those opposed in principle to parity for
corporate persons (as compared to natural persons) in the protection of constitutional
rights in general, or free speech rights in particular, this may be unacceptably narrow.
However, the heart of the democratic process in a representative democracy like ours
seems most directly in play in the election of public officials, at least at the federal level
where referenda are not allowed. Corporate speech on public issues can be valuable, particularly where the issues are about which business corporations, or labor unions, have
special knowledge and the risks of government suppression based on viewpoint might be
considerable. An amendment drafted to say only that “the First Amendment shall not be
construed to prohibit” would not remove the possibility of due process or equal protection challenges, allowing judicial review under those clauses to prevent abusive or discriminatory regulation (though carrying with it a risk that these latter clauses might be relied on to undo the intended effect of the amendment). Perhaps most importantly, an
amendment narrowly drawn to authorize government regulation only of electioneering
speech might actually win support from many corporations, see supra, note 116, thus increasing the chances of its being enacted.
Other issues would need to be addressed, including the scope of an exception for the
press, which any such amendment ought to include, and whether the amendment should
authorize legislative regulation of all corporate and limited liability entities or only of
those posing the special risks of for-profit business corporations and not-for-profits closely
related to or funded by for-profit businesses.
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all of the doctrine the amendment is designed to overturn? The latter result would appear to require so much bad faith in judicial interpretation that it seems most unlikely, at least soon after enactment;
plainly such an amendment would have been intended to have some
effect in permitting regulation not previously permitted. But there is
much to be debated and discussed as to the form of an amendment,
123
and its intended effects on allowing legislative discretion.
***
It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze all of these issues
or to draw a firm conclusion on whether, given the risks and benefits,
an amendment of the Constitution is the most appropriate response
to Citizens United, or if it is, what form it should take. The suggestion
is, however, that notwithstanding Friedman’s book, the people
should at times seriously consider amendments; and, moreover, that
there are some reasons why the Citizens United decision is an appropriate occasion for such serious consideration.
The hesitation of people of constitutional goodwill to seek
amendment of the Constitution is understandable, and, in many respects, wise. But at the same time, “amendophobia,” or a tendency to
discount amendment as a possible response to a constitutional decision also might be thought to sap the system of an important method
of reinvigorating our Constitution and of maintaining an appropriate
balance between judicial interpretation and public decision making
over what the Constitution should mean. Barry Friedman’s argument
that 1937 represented a decision by the people that constitutional
amendment through interpretation was legitimate if the interpretation was within some mainstream set of beliefs was not, I assume,
meant to suggest that Article V amendment has been or should be
abandoned as a method of legitimate constitutional change.
The “will of the people” can be expressed in many ways, and there
is something to be said for its expression in a written text, through a
formal process of iterative discussion and voting, with the acknowl-

123

A proposed amendment in the 1990s reportedly would have sought to overturn that part
of Buckley v. Valeo that prohibited legislatures from imposing expenditure limits on candidates, by authorizing Congress and the states to establish money limits on the amounts
candidates could spend on elections. See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83,
at 4–5; see also H.R.J. Res. 119, 105th Cong. (1998). Questions have been raised whether
such an approach would be too narrow, in not allowing the government to regulate issue
advocacy that may be aimed at influencing elections of particular candidates. CITIZENS
FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83, at 19.
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edged purposes of achieving constitutional change.
So Barry
Friedman’s book not only provides a compelling narrative of the Supreme Court’s relationship to the “will of the people,” but raises large
125
questions for us to consider and for future research.
These questions are not only about whether the Justices are “independent”
enough, but also about whether “the people” have allowed the Article
V amendment power to atrophy. Do we now have a constitutional
“convention” against formal amendments? Or can the “will of the
people” shift modalities and reassert itself through the formal
amendment process? Friedman’s eloquent and thoughtful narrative
of the role of public opinion in shaping the Supreme Court’s choices
is a joy to read. Perhaps in the future he will bring his analytical, historical, and narrative talents to bear on other modalities for constitutional change.

124

125

When the “flag burning” amendment was proposed in response to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310 (1990), some commentators argued that such an amendment would itself be unconstitutional. See Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J.
1073, 1073–74 (1991) (arguing that the right to free speech is a natural right retained by
the people that cannot be taken away “even by consent”). Given the Court’s retreat from
reviewing even procedural challenges to the amendment process, see Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939), there is very little likelihood that the Court would even consider a
substantive challenge to an amendment. Moreover, it would be difficult to make a convincing argument sounding in the premises of constitutionalism for the Court to declare
an amendment substantively unconstitutional: The great difficulty and multiple deliberation and filter points for amending the U.S. Constitution increases the likelihood that an
amendment will reflect a substantial supermajority in favor of the change, and there is no
positive basis in constitutional text to declare an amendment substantively unconstitutional, with the exception of the provisions of Article V relating to equal suffrage in the
Senate. See Vicki C. Jackson, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments (Aug. 11,
2010) (unpublished manuscript ) (on file with author).
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 373–74 (suggesting that “[w]hat we know is tentative,” and
may be seen as “an agenda for further research,” that can “move past the question of
whether the justices are influenced by popular opinion . . . [and] tackle the really meaningful question of when and how the justices are free to stand up to the popular will in
the name of the Constitution”).

